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DUMPING BY STATE-CONTROLLED-ECONOMY
COUNTRIES: THE POLISH GOLF CART CASE
AND THE NEW TREASURY REGULATIONS
Following the conclusion of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions in Geneva earlier this year,' Congress in July passed imple-
menting legislation in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.2 That
Act makes sweeping changes in the administration of the antidump-
ing laws and expressly repeals the Antidumping Act of 1921.3 But
it leaves untouched those substantive provisions addressed to dump-
ing by state-controlled-economy (SCE) countries,4 a subject of con-
tinuing controversy in recent yearsY
1The agreements were signed by the United States on April 12, 1979, HousE
Co.m. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE AGREEmm s ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No.
317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 H.R. REP.], and
President Carter transmitted them to the Congress on June 19. Id. 1. The text
of the agreements was published in House CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND
SENATE COMM. ON FInIANCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., MULTmATERAL TRADE NEcOTIA-
TIONS (Joint Comm. Print, WMCP: 96-18, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN
AGREEMENTs].
2Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979).
3Id., Title I, § 106 (repealing 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976)).
4 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979); current version at id., Title
I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b( c) ). See note 23 infra.
The term "state-controlled-economy country" has not been defined. With few
exceptions, it has been applied to countries usually identified as communist. See
Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist
Economies-Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967
CATT Code, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 159, 200-01 (1969).
5 The most recent and comprehensive discussion of dumping by state-controlled-
economy countries, presenting a constellation of views by foremost scholars, prac-
titioners, and bureaucrats in the field, is INTERFACE ONE: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
ON THE APPLIcATION oF U.S. ANTiDUMPYING AND COUNTERVAING DUTY LAWS TO
hIPORTS FROI STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMIES AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
(D. Wallace, G. Spina, R. Rawson, & B. McGill eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
INTERFACE ONE] (forthcoming). See Anthony, supra note 4; Feller, The Anti-
dumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REv. 115 (1967);
Wilczynski, Dumping and Central Planning, 74 J. POL. ECON. 250 (1966). See
also Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light
of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 189, 224-27 (1965); Fisher, The
Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAw &
Poy' INT'L Bus. 85, 129-35 (1973); Note, Treasury Runs the Maze: Less than
Fair Value Determinations Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 919, 928-29, 936-37 (1978).
For general discussions of United States antidumping law in addition to those
cited above, see Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United
States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1972);
Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1958); Comment,
The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law?, 74 YALE L.J. 707 (1965).
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Dumping occurs when a foreign producer sells his goods in the
United States at less than fair value.6 If such sales are taking place,
and are causing or threatening to cause material injury 7 to an in-
dustry in the United States, or if the sales are materially retarding
the establishment of a domestic industry, then an antidumping duty
is added with the aim of bringing the United States sale price into
line with the fair value of the merchandise." In an ordinary case,
involving goods imported from a market-economy country, the fair
value, or foreign market value, is determined by the price at which
the foreign producer sells his goods in his home market.9 Alter-
natively, the test of foreign market value may be the price at which
the goods are sold for export to countries other than the United
States,'0 or it may be the constructed value,"' computed as the cost
of production plus amounts for general expenses and profits.' 2
Special problems arise if these tests for foreign market value
are applied to goods imported from state-controlled-economy (SCE)
countries. Central planning and the absence of a market structure
are widely thought to destroy the usefulness of all three tests as
reliable indicators of the value of the goods in question.13 In
recognition of this problem, Congress enacted section 205(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974,14 which provides that the foreign market value
6 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 144
(July 26, 1979) (to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19
U.S.C. § 1673).
7 The requirement that the injury be "material" is a major innovation made by
the 1979 Act. See 1979 H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 45-49.
8 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 101, 93 Stat. 144
(July 26, 1979) (to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19
U.S.C. § 1673).
9Id. (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §1677b(a)(1)(A)).
lId. (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)).
11Id. (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2)).
12Id. (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)).
13 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 S. REP], reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7311.
14 Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978 (repealed, Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979);
current version at id., Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)). In its new home at §773(c) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, old § 205(c) now reads:
If available information indicates to the administering authority that the
economy of the country from which the merchandise is exported is State-
controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar
merchandise in that country or to countries other than the United States
do not permit a determination of foreign market value under subsection (a)
of this section, the administering authority shall determine the foreign
market value of the merchandise on the basis of the normal costs, expenses,
and profits as reflected by either-(1) the prices, determined in accordance
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of SCE-country imports is to be determined by looking to the price
or constructed value of similar products sold or produced in a third
or surrogate non-SCE country.
The interpretation of section 205(c) is of very great importance
to many communist countries whose trade with the United States
has grown rapidly in recent years.' 5 To date, the chief experience
in applying section 205(c) has been the Polish Golf Cart Case,16 an
antidumping proceeding that has accordingly assumed a significance
extending far beyond the manicured golf links of suburban America.
A Polish manufacturer of electric golf carts, produced solely for ex-
port to the United States, successfully made inroads into the Ameri-
can market. On the basis of the sales prices of a small Canadian
producer, the Polish carts were found to be priced at less than fair
value,' 7 and to be injuring the domestic United States industry.' s
In the duty-assessment stage of the proceedings, however, the
Canadian manufacturer's output was no longer deemed sufficient to
with subsection (a) of this section, at which such or similar merchandise
of a non-State-controlled-economy country or countries is sold either-
(A) for consumption in the home market of that country or countries, or
(B) to other countries, including the United States; or (2) the constructed
value of such or similar merchandise in a non-State-controlled-economy
country or countries as determined under subsection (e).
15 From 1967 to 1975, United States imports from Poland increased more than
250%, from $87.675 million to $234.14 million. Imports from Hungary during the
same period multiplied eleven times over, from $5.699 million to $63.710 million,
while the influx of goods from Czechoslovakia, rising from $.98 million in 1967 to
$37.778 million in 1975, is so great as to render percentages meaningless. [1970-
1971] Y.B. Ihr'L TaDnE STATS. 31, 167, 628 (United Nations 1973); [1976] 1 Y.B.
INT'L TRADE STATS. 289, 442, 718 (United Nations 1977). From 1977 to 1978,
imports from these same countries continued to grow: Poland, 33%; Hungary, 46%;
and Czechoslovakia, 58%. Office of East-West Policy and Planning, Dep't of
Commerce, U.S. Trade Status with Communist Countries 4 (May 24, 1979).
16 The earnest Bluebooker must here confess frustration over his inability to
provide the reader with a useful citation. The Polish Golf Cart Case is an
interminable proceeding about which very little meaningful information has been
published by the authorities involved. Although the Treasury Department duly
marks significant events in the Federal Register, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975);
40 Fed. Beg. 11,917 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (1974), findings of fact and
conclusions of law are only hinted at in these notices so that the researcher has the
sensation of a quick glimpse through a small keyhole. No improvement can be
expected under Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which, although mandating notice
of all final determinations, apparently does not require publication of factflndings
and legal conclusions. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I,
§ 101, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979) (to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930, at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(d)). See 1979 H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 69.
A separate antitrust action involving Polish golf carts, Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978), should not be confused with the
antidumping proceeding which is the subject of this Comment.
17 40 Fed. Beg. 25,497 (1975).
18 Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,153 (1975) (U.S.I.T.C.
finding of injury to United States industry).
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reflect foreign market value, and the Treasury Department, for lack
of any other foreign golf cart manufacturer of adequate size, an-
nounced its intention to use the domestic prices of United States
manufacturers as the determinant of the competing Polish golf carts'
foreign market value.19 That predicament elicited howls from
Polish trade representatives and catalyzed a rethinking within the
Treasury,20 which ultimately led to the promulgation of new
Treasury regulations in August, 1978.21 Under the new regulations,
the use of third-country prices and production costs is circumscribed
by a requirement that the third country be one at a stage of eco-
nomic development comparable to that of the exporting SCE
country.22 In addition, if, as in the Polish case, no comparable
market-economy country produces a similar product, a constructed
value test may be employed which first ascertains the actual physical
inputs in the SCE manufacturer's production process, and then
values those inputs in the economic setting of a comparably de-
veloped market-economy country.
23
19 Letter from Carl W. Schwarz, Counsel for Melex USA, Inc., to Representative
Charles A. Vanik, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means (Apr. 27, 1979), reprinted in Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 735 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House MTN
Hearings].
2O Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
117, 125 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing] (statement
of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Counsel to AMF, Inc., and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, Harley Davidson Motor Co.).
21Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, 43
Fed. Reg. 35,262 (1978) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 153.7 (1979)). Conforming
changes were also made to § 153.27, which specifies the nature of the allegations
required in a complaint to the Treasury raising a question of dumping. See 19
C.F.R. § 153.27 (1979). Although this Comment refers to the "September 1978,
regulations" in the plural, it focuses solely on the amendments to § 153.7 and nowhere
discusses the technicalities of amended § 153.27. See text accompanying notes
78-120 infra.
2219 C. F. R. § 153.7(b) (1979).
23 Id. § 153.7(c). The House Report accompanying the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 was careful to avoid expressing any opinion on the Treasury regulations:
Although this report contains the general caveat that this bill is
intended to implement only those changes in domestic law which are con-
sidered necessary or appropriate to make U.S. law consistent with the
international agreements and is not intended as a general expression of
approval of current regulations or administrative practice, the Committee
believes it is necessary to emphasize the specific application of that caveat
to the current law on dumping from non-market economy countries. The
reenactment of current statutory provisions on this subject is not an
expression of congressional approval or disapproval of the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury on August 9, 1978 (43
F.R. 35262).
1979 H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 76-77.
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In part I, this Comment briefly reviews the economic theory of
the antidumping law, the history of efforts by the Treasury, prior
to 1974, to apply the law to SCE countries, and the problems con-
fronting the SCE producer under section 205(c). Part II develops
the facts of the Polish Golf Cart Case, and part III, discussing the
controversy surrounding the September, 1978, Treasury regulations,
concludes that the regulations are consistent with the statute and
based on sound policy considerations.
I. ANTIDUMPING THEORY, THE THIRD-COUNTRY TEST,
AND SECTION 205(c)
A. The Economic Theory of Antidumping Laws
The classic definition of dumping as "price discrimination be-
tween national markets," 24 was formulated by Jacob Viner in 1923.
Specifically, dumping occurs when a foreign producer sells his goods
for export to a target market at prices lower than he sells those same
goods in his own home market.25 From a theoretical economic
viewpoint, dumping, or selling abroad at less than "fair value," is
not evil per se.26 If a steady stream of goods at differentially low
prices could be guaranteed, no harm would ultimately result. In-
jury to the target market's domestic industry would be more than
offset by the benefit of a constant supply of cheap goods. But if
the seller cuts short the stream of cheap goods once he has elimi-
nated the target market's domestic competition, and raises the prices
of his goods to artificially high and noncompetitive levels, the long-
range injury to competition in the target market outweighs the
temporary benefit of lower prices.
According to the theory of international free trade, free com-
petition among nations will maximize efficiency and result in lower
prices, as each nation specializes in producing those goods for which
it is best suited.27 Short-run or predatory dumping of the kind just
described, because it derails this "natural law" of comparative ad-
vantage, constitutes an unfair international trade practice, against
which nations espousing free trade principles may legitimately de-
fend themselves. Significantly, however, to avoid a protectionist
result, laws designed to combat dumping must not place sanctions
24 J. VH'MR, DUMPING: A ROBLEM IN INTERNAIONAL TRADE 3 (1923).
25 Anthony, supra note 4, at 159.
26 For a short discussion of the economics of dumping, see id. 163-77. J. VIR,
supra note 24, is still the major authority on the subject.
27See, e.g., P. SAMUE SON, EcoNoMIcs 668-91 (10th ed. 1976); Anthony,
supra note 4, at 163-77.
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on all imports that undersell domestic goods,28 but only on those
imports that undersell domestic goods by exploiting an artificial or
anticompetitive advantage. Price-discriminatory exports are taken
to indicate just such an artificial advantage, on the assumption that
the lower export prices are subsidized by higher prices in the
dumper's home or other markets and thus do not reflect the fair
value of the goods, understood as cost plus profit.29
Thus, the real cost of the imported goods, whether reflected by
home market prices, export prices, or some hypothetical construc-
tion, must be the touchstone of any investigation to determine
whether dumping has occurred. When cost or price data are un-
obtainable or unreliable, the conventional economic theory under-
lying antidumping laws breaks down, and attempts to discover the
value of imported goods may degenerate into mere speculation.
B. Application of the Antidumping Act to State-Controlled-
Economy Countries Prior to 1974
State-controlled-economy (SCE) countries present special prob-
lems for the calculation of foreign market value. The normal tests,
based on the price in the home market, the export price to countries
other than the United States, or the constructed value, all presup-
pose a free market in which prices are set by the rise and fall of
supply and demand. In a planned economy, however, home market
prices are fixed by governmental authorities on the basis of pro-
duction or import goals and projected demand elasticity, 0 and
need not ultimately reflect the true costs of production. Export
prices to countries other than the United States may give no better
clue to actual production costs in an SCE country because they, too,
are likely to be determined by noneconomic influences. 31 As with
prices, the attempt to arrive at actual costs by means of a constructed-
value test encounters the fundamental difficulty of ascertaining
values in a nonmarket economy.
28 In theory, a foreign manufacturer could dump his goods in the United States
even though he sold them at prices equal to or higher than his United States com-
petitors. Dumping that does not undersell domestic prices has been labeled
"technical dumping" and will not result in a finding of injury. See, e.g., Vinyl Clad
Fence Fabric from Canada, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,243, 51,244-45 (1975) (concurring
statement of reasons of Comm'rs Moore and Ablondi).
29 See Anthony, supra note 4, at 166-77.
30 Feller, supra note 5, at 118.
31 Id. 128.
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When the Antidumping Act of 1921 was adopted, 2 dumping
by SCE countries was not a pressing problem. The only SCE
country then existing, the Soviet Union, was still in its infancy, and
the Act understandably contained no provisions concerning econo-
mies not organized on free market principles. As market-economy
countries and SCE countries alike became interested during the
1950s in increased East-West trade, the shortcomings of the 1921
Act soon became apparent.
In the first case in which imports from an SCE country were
found to be selling at less than fair value, Bicycles from Czecho-
slovakia,33 Treasury employed neither the home market price nor
the export price nor the constructed value. In their place, a new
"third-country" 34 test was applied, which looked to the home market
or export price of similar merchandise produced in a non-SCE
country.35 In Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheetglass from Czechoslovakia,6
the third-country price test was made explicit, and the possibility of
using a constructed-value test was rejected because of an asserted
lack of data on costs, expenses, and profits.
Authority for this rejection of the statutory methods of calcu-
lation was eventually offered in Portland Cement from Poland,T in
which the Treasury concluded that sales in an SCE country do not
qualify as sales "in the ordinary course of trade" as required by
the Act.3 8  Such an interpretation found support in J.H. Cottman
& Co. v. United States,39 a decision of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals holding that the "ordinary course of trade" referred
to conditions in a free market economy, where competitive forces
are allowed to operate without restriction.
4 0
32 Ch. 14, Title II, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (repealed Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979); current
version .at id., Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of
1930, at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g)).
3325 Fed. Reg. 6657 (1960).
34 The term "third country" is used in this Comment to refer to the selection
of a surrogate market-economy country for the purpose of valuing imports from an
SCE country. It should not be confused with the test of foreign market value,
which looks to the export price to countries other than the United States and
which shall be referred to as the export-price test.
35 See Feller, supra note 5, at 130 n.65.
36 27 Fed. Reg. 8457 (1962).
3728 Fed. Beg. 6660 (1963).
38 19 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976) (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979); current version at id.,
Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (A)).
3920 C.C.P.A. 334, 357 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 750 (1933).
40 See Feller, supra note 5, at 126.
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The third-country test was used consistently during the 1960s. 41
Occasionally, adjustments were allowed for differences in transporta-
tion costs, quality, and productive efficiency. 42  As trade with SCE
countries continued to increase, however, Treasury's ad hoc treat-
ment of the problem was brought to the attention of Congress. The
result was section 205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974.43
C. Section 205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974
Section 205(c) enacted the Treasury's third-country test into
law. If the Secretary finds that the exporting economy is state-
controlled to the extent that foreign market value cannot be calcu-
lated by the ordinary tests, 44 he may employ:
(1) the prices . . . at which such or similar merchandise
of a non-state-controlled-economy country or countries is
sold either (A) for consumption in the home market of
that country or countries, or (B) to other countries, includ-
ing the United States; or
(2) the constructed value of such or similar merchandise
in a non-state-controlled-economy country or countries
45
Although section 205(c) itself stated no preference, prior Treasury
practice tended to rely on third-country prices and not on con-
structed values.
46
Like the Treasury's ad hoc third-country price test, the price
test option embodied in section 205(c) confronts the SCE exporter
with substantial uncertainties not faced by his capitalist counterpart.
Imagine an SCE exporter who wishes to sell his product in the
United States for $100. A similar domestic United States product
sells for $140, and similar West German merchandise costs the
United States consumer $135. A Japanese firm sells the same article
for consumption in Japan for only $99.47 Depending on which
foreign country is selected by the Treasury as the third country, the
foreign market value of the SCE exporter's product may range from
4 1 Anthony, supra note 4, at 200 & n.169.
42 E.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe and Fittings from Poland, 32 Fed. Reg. 2901
(1967); Shoes from Czechoslovakia, 31 Fed. Reg. 1207, 7087 (1966).
43 Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978 (repealed, Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979);
current version at id., Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Anthony, supra note 4, at 200-05.
47 This hypothetical is adapted from remarks of Professor Stanislaw J. Soltysinski
In INTERFACE ONE, supra note 5, at 97.
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$99 to $135. Unlike the market-economy exporter who enjoys a
reasonable assurance that the foreign market value of his products
will be determined by his home market prices or his export price
to other countries-prices which he surely has knowledge of and
over which he exerts control-the SCE exporter has no way of
knowing whether he is dumping until an antidumping proceeding
gets under way.
48
The unfairness of selectively imposing these risks on SCE ex-
porters is further magnified by an ambiguity in the language of
section 205(c), which can be read to allow selection of the United
States as the third country whose home market or export price is
determinative of foreign market value. Thus, in the illustration
above, the Treasury would be free to find the United States manu-
facturer's price of $140 as the price "at which such or similar
merchandise of a non-state-controlled-economy country [the United
States] . . . is sold . . . for consumption in the home market
.. . .,, Unless used with restraint, such a construction of the
Act, although perhaps supported by the legislative history,- 0 is
48 Congress in 1974 did express concern for the predicament of foreign pro-
ducers who risk antidumping duties on the basis of prices charged by others and
over which they have no control, and accordingly amended § 212(3) of the Anti-
dumping Act to eliminate from the definition of "such or similar merchandise"
merchandise "produced by another person." See 19 U.S.C. § 170(a) (1976) (re-
pealed, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat.
144 (July 26, 1979); current version at id., Title I, § 101, to be codified as an
amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)); 1974 S. REP., supra
note 13, at 177, reprinted in 1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7314;
H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 H.R.
REP.].
Counsel for Melex USA, Inc., the American subsidiary of the Polish golf cart
manufacturer, concocted the ingenious argument that this redefinition must be
read into § 205(c), with the result that the third-country-price test can only be
employed if the SCE producer is producing goods in a market-economy country, as,
for example, if Poland began manufacturing golf carts in a plant in Spain. Com-
ments of Melex USA, Inc., on Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise
from State-Controlled-Economy Countries 7-8 (Feb. 22, 1978) (hereinafter cited
as Melex Comments] (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view). Although the argument is technically a compelling one, it is readily ap-
parent that strict application of the rules of construction here produces an absurd
result. Congress, in endorsing Treasury's existing practice of applying a third-
country-price test, could hardly have meant to confine its use in the future to a
situation never before encountered.
49 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979); current version at id.,
Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)).
GO The Senate Report, referring to § 205(c), expressly noted:
The amendment is intended to permit comparison of the purchase price or
exporters' sales price of the merchandise in question with the prices of
such or similar merchandise produced in the United States in the absence of
an adequate basis for comparison using prices in other non-State-controlled-
economy countries.
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patently protectionist. Freewheeling use of domestic United States
prices as the standard of fair value effectively eliminates competition
by SCE imports. Because the exporter's costs of packaging, ship-
ping, and insurance would have to be added to the United States
manufacturer's price,el the imported goods would have to be sold at
higher prices than the domestic variety.
On its face, section 205(c) puts the SCE producer at a further
disadvantage because it does not provide for adjustments based on
proven economies.52 An efficient producer in a free market economy
can avoid antidumping duties and reap the benefit of his lower costs
by evenhandedly selling at low prices in his home market as well
as in the United States. No matter how efficient or evenhanded the
SCE exporter, the Trade Act of 1974 does not expressly provide that
his efficiency shall be taken into account. The "value" of his goods
will be determined, not by reference to his costs or his sales, but by
reference to the sales or costs of an undetermined, possibly less
efficient manufacturer in a third country.
These problems with the application of section 205(c) 's foreign
market value tests to SCE countries-the gross uncertainty, the pos-
sibly unrestrained use of United States domestic prices, and the
omission of provisions permitting cost-justified adjustments-all de-
rive from a common source: the failure to assure that the resulting
foreign market value reflects the true costs of production. Such a
departure from cost considerations creates havoc because it runs
counter to the basic principles underlying United States antidump-
ing law. That law was intended to prevent unfair competition by
prohibiting predatory dumping, not to protect United States in-
1974 S. REP., supra note 13, at 174, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7186, 7311. The House Report did not take a position on this issue. See
1973 H.R. REP., supra note 48, at 157. For the view that the quoted sentence in
the Senate Report was "a gratuitous addition .. .which had, and has, absolutely
no basis in fact or law," see Melex Comments, supra note 48, at 13.
Prior to the promulgation of the September, 1978, regulations, the regulation in
force provided that United States prices or constructed value "generally will be
utilized" where sales in market-economy countries other than the United States
"do not provide an adequate basis for comparison." 19 C.F.R. § 153.7 (1978). For
the full text of the pre-1978 regulation, see note 89 infra. It is unclear, however,
whether the Treasury ever used domestic United States prices as a determinant of
foreign market value prior to 1974. See 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262, 35,264 (1978).
51 Letter from Stanislaw J. Soltysinski, Special Counsel to Pezetel, to Robert
H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (Aug. 25, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Soltysinski Letter] (copy on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review). Contra, 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20,
at 117, 122 (statement of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.).
5 2 INTEP.FACE ONE, supra note 5, at 75, 82 (address by Deputy Assistant
Treasury Secretary Peter D. Ehrenhaft); id. 98 (remarks of Professor Stanislaw J.
Soltysinski).
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dustry from efficiently made, lower-priced imports.63 Without a
method for approximating the SCE exporter's actual costs, any de-
termination of the foreign market value of his goods is necessarily
arbitrary. The tests contained in section 205(c), because they may
be applied without regard to actual costs, do not adequately restrain
the potential use of antidumping law as a protectionist barrier to
East-West trade.
Focus on these issues of valuation sharpened in the Polish Golf
Cart Case and eventually resulted in the promulgation of new
regulations.
II. THE Polish Golf Cart Case
Beginning in 1971, Poland began to export to the United States
its Melex golf carts, designed on the model of the E-Z Go cart made
by Textron, Inc., the number one United States manufacturer . 4
In 1974, nearly seven thousand Melex carts were sold, accounting
for twelve percent of all golf carts sold in this country.55 In April
of that year, Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., the second largest
domestic manufacturer of golf carts,5 6 filed with the Treasury
Department a complaint alleging that Pezetel, the Polish manu-
facturer, was selling its golf carts in the United States at less than
fair value.57 Shortly thereafter, Treasury announced the institution
of an inquiry into the charges, 58 followed in March, 1975, by a
notice of withholding of appraisement, 59 a procedure mandated by
its finding that reasonable grounds existed for suspecting that the
Polish golf carts were being sold at less than fair value. Finally, on
June 11, 1975, Treasury announced that its reasonable suspicions
had hardened into a firm determination of less-than-fair-value sales.6 0
Over the objections of Harley Davidson, Treasury's calculation
of the foreign market value of Melex golf carts in this initial phase
of the proceedings was based on the 1974 sales of a small Canadian
53 1974 S. REP., supra note 13, at 179, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 7186, 7316.
541978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 123-24 (statement of
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.).
55 Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,153 (1975).
56 Letter from Carl W. Schwarz to Representative Charles A. Vanik, supra
note 19.
57 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 122 (statement of Charles
Owen Verrill, Jr.).
5s 39 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (1974).
5040 Fed. Reg. 11,917 (1975). The notice, in effect, directed customs officers
to postpone determinations of the tariff to be levied on Polish golf carts entering the
country, pending the outcome of the antidumping proceeding.
00 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975).
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manufacturer, Marathon Golf Car Co., Ltd.61  Harley Davidson
urged Treasury to use the higher sales prices of domestic United
States manufacturers. For its part, Pezetel, also unhappy with
Treasury's methodology, complained that Treasury ignored two in-
dependent studies of the constructed value of Polish golf carts as
produced under Canadian conditions; both studies showed that the
carts were not being dumped.62 The Treasury's calculations, ac-
cording to Pezetel, while concededly allowing a small adjustment
for economies of scale, 63 failed to take into account the significantly
lower labor costs in Poland.6 Notwithstanding these objections,
Treasury calculated foreign market value on the basis of the
Canadian manufacturer and found substantial dumping margins, in
some cases exceeding twenty percent, for all Melex sales in 1974.65
In September of 1975, the International Trade Commission
found that the less-than-fair-value sales of Polish golf carts had in-
jured the domestic industry,66 and the case entered the duty-assess-
ment stage.
No duties were liquidated until mid-1977, when Treasury, on
the basis of the 1974 Marathon prices adjusted for inflation,67 as-
sessed duties of up to $155 per cart for the first eight months of
1975 and collected more than $600,000.68 Although the question
has been disputed, it appears that by 1976, Marathon's production
of golf carts no longer sufficed to form the basis of a foreign market
value determination for the continuing influx of Melex golf carts.6 9
At first indicating that duties for the first three quarters of 1976
611978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 123. Marathon pro-
duced approximately 200 golf carts in 1974, id., in comparison with Pezetel's produc-
tion capacity of 10,000 per year. Id. 129. Counsel for Melex referred to Marathon
as a "Mom and Pop" producer of "custom made" golf carts. Letter from Carl W.
Schwarz to Representative Charles A. Vanik, supra note 19.
62 Soltysinski Letter, supra note 51.
'6 Id. Contra, 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 123 (state-
ment of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., alleging that Treasury granted a substantial
reduction for economies of scale).
64 Soltysinsli Letter, supra note 51.
65 Electric Golf Cars from Poland, 40 Fed. Reg. 49,153, 49,154 (1975).
66 Id.
67 Comments of Harley Davidson Motor Co. on Proposed Amendments Pertain-
ing to Merchandise from State-Controlled-Economy Countries 8 (Feb. 16, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Harley Davidson Comments] (copy on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review).
68 Id.
69 Counsel for Harley Davidson alleged that Marathon had ceased producing
golf carts and had only nominal sales of a utility vehicle that was similar in design.
1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 125 (statement of Charles Owen
Verrill, Jr.). Counsel for Pezetel insisted that Marathon was not going out of
business, but instead had nearly doubled its 1974 sales in 1976. Soltysinski Letter,
supra note 51.
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would again be assessed on the basis of adjusted 1974 Canadian
sales, 70 Treasury later reversed itself, yielding to Harley Davidson's
persistent contention that the domestic prices of a United States
manufacturer should be the referent for the foreign market value of
the Polish golf carts.
7 1
This result vexed the Poles, who argued forcefully that use of
domestic United States prices would effectively bar Melex carts alto-
gether. When the additional costs of ocean freight, insurance, and
normal duties were taken into account, Pezetel would be required
to sell its golf carts at prices substantially higher than those of
United States models.72 That anomaly was not lost on Treasury
officials,73 and discussions within the Treasury Department and with
Polish trade representatives led eventually to proposal of new regu-
lations in January, 1978. 74 On September 8, 1978, those proposed
regulations, with modifications, became effective.75
The brief history recounted here suffices to show that prior to
the September, 1978, regulations, the Polish manufacturer faced an
American bureaucratic nightmare of Kafkaesque dimensions. The
extreme injustice of using domestic United States prices as the test
of the foreign market value of Melex carts only compounded the
unfairness of computing the carts' value without regard to the
claimed cost and production advantages achieved by Pezetel's effi-
cient operation.7 6 Moreover, Pezetel confronted the uncertainty of
not knowing from week to week how the value of its golf carts would
be measured. In the words of Pezetel's special counsel:
In short, for the last three years, Pezetel has been con-
fronted with endless shifting and unclear interpretations of
the applicable statute, and unfair and arbitrary resolutions
70 Letter from Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal to Representative
Henry S. Reuss (Nov. 28, 1977), quoted in Harley Davidson Comments, supra
note 67, at 8-9.
71 Letter from Carl W. Schwarz to Representative Charles A. Vanik, supra
note 19. No duties have yet been liquidated under this standard.
72 Soltysinski Letter, supra note 51.
73Letter from Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Peter D. Ehrenhaft to
Representative Henry S. Reuss (Dec. 28, 1977), quoted in Harley Davidson Com-
mnents, supra note 67, at 8-9.
7443 Fed. Reg. 1356 (1978).
75 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262 (1978). The Poles attempted to persuade Treasury
.to apply the new regulations retroactively to 1975, a move which, if successful,
-would have avoided heavy duties during 1975-1978 based on United States manu-
facturers' prices. Treasury appears to have taken a firm stand that the regulations
may only be applied to goods entering the country after September 8, 1978, the
.date when the regulations took effect. See 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra
-note 20, at 117, 126-27.
70 Soltysinski Letter, supra note 51.
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of the factual issues under that statute. As a result, it is
now utterly impossible for Pezetel (and the whole of Polish
industry) to determine what is required of it by American
law, or to know whether or not it is considered to be
dumping. In fact, in the past six months, various Customs
officials have given Pezetel estimates of foreign market
value ranging from $643 to $1300.
77
III. THE SEPTEMBER, 1978, TREASURY REGULATIONS
The new regulations promulgated by the Treasury,'7 8 effective
September 8, 1978, go a long way towards solving the problems with
77 Id.
78 19 C.F.R. § 153.7 (1979):
(a) General. If the information available indicates to the Secretary that
the economy of the country from which the merchandise is exported is
state-controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar
merchandise in that country or to countries other than the United States
do not permit a determination of fair value under § 153.2, § 153.3, or
§ 153.4, the Secretary shall determine fair value on the basis of the normal
costs, expenses, and profits as reflected by either:
(1) the prices, determined in accordance with subsection 205(a) and
section 202 of the Act (19 U.S.C. 164(a), 161) at which such or similar
merchandise of a non-state-controlled economy country or countries is sold
either: (i) For consumption in the home market of that country or coun-
tries, or (ii) to other countries, including the United States; or
(2) The constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-
state-controlled-economy country or countries.
(b) Comparability of economies. (1) The prices as determined
under § 153.7 (a) (1), or the constructed value as determined under § 153.7
(a)(2), shall be determined, to the extent possible, from the prices or
costs in a non-state-controlled-economy country or countries at a stage of
economic development comparable to the state-controlled-economy country
from which the merchandise is exported. Comparability of economic de-
velopment shall be determined from generally recognized criteria, includ-
ing per capita gross national product and infrastructure development (par-
ticularly in the industry producing such or similar merchandise).
(2) If no non-state-controlled-economy country of comparable
economic development can be identified, then the prices or constructed
value as determined from another non-state-controlled-economy country
or countries other than the United States shall be used.
(3) If neither § 153.7(b) (1) nor (b) (2) provides an adequate basis
for determining the price or constructed value of such or similar merchan-
dise, then the prices or constructed value, as determined from the sales or
production of such or similar merchandise in the United States, shall be used.
(c) Use of constructed value. If such or similar merchandise is not
produced in a non-state-controlled-economy country which is concluded to
be comparable in terms of economic development to the state-controlled-
economy country from which the merchandise is exported, the constructed
value of such or similar merchandise may be determined from the costs of
specific objective components or factors of production incurred in producing
the merchandise in question, including, but not limited to, hours of labor
required, quantities of raw materials employed, and amounts of energy con-
sumed, if such information is obtained from the producer of the merchan-
dise in the state-controlled-economy country under investigation, and
verification of such information in the state-controlled-economy country is
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section 205(c) so pointedly raised by the Polish Golf Cart Case.
They begin by stating that price or constructed value shall be com-
puted from cost and price data in a market-economy country at a
stage of development comparable to the exporting SCE country79
If no comparable market-economy country can be found, the price
or constructed value shall be measured by data taken from a non-
comparable market-economy country other than the United States.0
If that option fails to provide an adequate basis for determining
foreign market value, then, and only then, will the Treasury resort
to United States domestic prices or costs."'
With respect to constructed value, the regulations provide that
the SCE manufacturer may furnish data on the "specific objective
components" of production, such as hours of labor, quantities of
raw materials, and amounts of energy consumed. These com-
ponents, if verified, will then be valued in a comparable non-state-
controlled-economy country. Two criteria of comparability specifi-
cally endorsed by the regulations are per capita gross national
product and infrastructure development.
8 2
Although the new regulations do not eliminate the hazards of
unpredictability inherent in the statute, they mark a significant
advance. Where before the Treasury was free to select any third
country as the benchmark of fair value, now the choice is limited,
to the extent possible, to third countries of comparable economic
development. However uncertain the concept of comparability may
be in theoryns the regulations give hope of a case-law development
which, in practice, will provide increasingly concrete and trust-
worthy guidelines to the SCE exporter.
The explicit constraints placed by the regulations on the use
of United States domestic prices and cost figures constitute a second
advance. Although the regulations do not discard this test alto-
gether, a step that would probably have violated the intent of
concluded to the satisfaction of the Secretary. Such components or factors
shall be valued and such values verified in a non-state-controlled-economy
country determined to be reasonably comparable in economic development
to the state-controlled-economy country under investigation. To the values
thus obtained, there shall be added an amount for general expenses and
profits, as required by section 206(a)(2) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 165
(a)(2)), and the cost of all containers and coverings and other expenses,
as required by section 206(a)(3) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 165(a)(2)).
7919 C.F.R. § 153.7(b)(1) (1979).
80d. § 153.7(b) (2).
Said. § 153.7(b) (3).
821d. § 153.7(c).
83 See text accompanying notes 108-20 infma
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Congress, s4 they make its use highly improbable. The only con-
ceivable situation in which an SCE exporter would be threatened
with a finding of foreign market value based on United States
manufacturers' domestic prices or costs would be one in which a)
no comparably developed economy could be found which produced
similar merchandise, and b) a constructed value based on the ex-
porter's own production factors could not be calculated because the
exporter refused to come forward with the applicable data. In this
new setting, then, the domestic United States price or constructed-
value tests will serve as a useful spur to disclosure by SCE producers.
A third advantage of the 1978 regulations is the use of data on
the "specific objective components" of production in the SCE
country, an innovation "which recognizes both natural advantages
and possible disadvantages of production for the producer." s5
Under the old regulation, an efficient SCE exporter ran the risk of
being saddled with a valuation based on the prices of an inefficient
third-country manufacturer. Although he might produce an item
with one-half the manpower costs required by the inefficient third-
country manufacturer, computation of the foreign market value
would ignore the SCE exporter's "specific objective components" of
production and thus overlook his efficient use of labor. The
amended regulations, to the extent they permit use of constructed
value based on actual physical inputs, place the SCE exporter on a
more equal footing with his market-economy competitors.
The language of the new regulations, 6 and the Customs Service
protestations,8 7 leave no doubt that price tests will continue to enjoy
official preference over constructed value. Nevertheless, in practice,
constructed value will enjoy increased use. Under amended section
153.7(c), 8 constructed value may be employed whenever prices of
identical or similar merchandise from a comparable economy are
not available; in the past, no strict comparability rule limited the
use of the price test.8 9 Differences in trade behavior between SCE
84 See note 50 supra.
85 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262, 35,264 (1978). See text accompanying note 52 supra.
8 6 See note 78 supra.
sr "The regulations as adopted should make it clear that costs of production in
a non-state-controlled-economy country of comparable economic development will
be used only if . .. [price information is unavailable ..... 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262,
35,264 (1978).
88 19 C.F.R. § 153.7(c) (1979).
89 1979 House MTN Hearings, supra note 19, at 106, 109 (statement of Charles
Owen Verrill, Jr.). Prior to the September, 1978 amendments, § 153.7 read as
follows:
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countries and market-economy countries may also work to favor use
of constructed value. Most SCE countries, because of central plan-
ning, are better able than are market-economy countries at com-
parable stages of development to channel resources into the manu-
facture of products specially for export to the United States.
Consequently, the advent of the comparable-economy concept may
serve to establish constructed value, based on actual physical inputs,
as the principal determinant of foreign market value. Because the
constructed-value method offers the SCE exporter a more realistic
valuation of his goods,90 this development should exert a beneficial
influence on administration of the antidumping law and the future
of East-West trade.
A. Statutory Objections
Opponents of the new regulations raised two major arguments
against them, one statutory and the other economic. First, they
contended that the amended regulations were inconsistent with
section 205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974. Second, they questioned
the theoretical soundness of the concept of comparably developed
economies, specifically ridiculing the underlying presumption that
economies comparable in macroeconomic terms are also micro-
economically similar.
Significantly, the statutory arguments do not rest on the word-
ing of section 205(c), 91 which neither expressly nor impliedly contra-
If the information available indicates to the Secretary that the economy
of the country from which the merchandise is exported is state-controlled
to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar merchandise in
that country or to countries other than the United States do not permit a
determination of fair value under §§ 153.2, 153.3, or 153.4, the Secretary
shall determine fair value on the basis of the normal costs, expenses, and
profits as reflected by either:
(a) The prices, determined in accordance with section 205(a) and
section 202 of the Act (19 U.S.C. 164(a), 161), at which such or similar
merchandise of a non-state-controlled-economy country or countries, in-
cluding the United States, is sold either (1) for consumption in the home
market of that country or countries, or (2) to other countries, including
the United States; or
(b) The constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-
state-controlled-economy country or countries, including the United States,
as determined under section 206 of the Act (19 U.S.C. 165).
The prices or the constructed value of the United States produced mer-
chandise generally will be utilized where sales or offers for sale of such or
similar merchandise in any other non-state-controlled-economy country do
not provide an adequate basis for comparison.
19 C.F.R. § 153.7 (1978).
90 INTERFAC. ONE, supra note 5, at 98 (remarks of Professor Soltysinski).
91 See note 14 supra.
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dicts the new regulations. Instead, the opponents of the regulations,
drawing inferences from the legislative history and the past admin-
istration of the antidumping law, purported to show that the
regulations violate the intent of Congress.
The chief premise of the statutory argument is that by enacting
section 205(c), Congress meant to ratify the existing Treasury prac-
tice with respect to SCE countries. That practice, as expressed in
the pre-1974 regulation 92 and as administered by the Treasury,
93
contained no requirement that the choice of a third country be
restricted in the first instance to market-economy countries at stages
of development comparable to the SCE country in question. More-
over, nothing in the language of the 1974 amendments, nor in the
legislative history, made any reference to the concept of compara-
bility. In adding the comparability requirement, the argument
goes, Treasury went beyond the authority given it by section 205(c).
94
These contentions the Treasury properly rejected. Although
both the Senate and the House Reports clearly indicate a congres-
sional intent to give legislative approval to Treasury's pre-1974
practice,95 such a ratification is hardly inconsistent with the refine-
ment contained in the new regulations. In its early approach to
imports from SCE countries, the Treasury invented a procedure for
which it had no clear authority under the Antidumping Act of
92 See 19 C.F.R. § 153.5 (1973).
93 In its discussion of comments submitted on the proposed regulations, Treasury
alleged that in selecting third-country surrogates in the past, it had "attempted to
select a country that is most like the exporting country." 43 Fed. Reg. 35,262,
35,263 (1978). For this alleged past practice the Treasury did not cite any cases,
and one commenter argued persuasively that the case law contradicted the existence
of a pre-1974 comparability standard. Memorandum of Westinghouse Electric
Corp. on Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise from State-Controlled-
Economy Countries 3-5 (May 22, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Westinghouse Memo-
randum] (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Even assuming that the Treasury had pursued an unannounced policy of select-
ing third countries on the basis of comparability, it is extremely unlikely that
Congress was aware of such an obscure practice when it enacted § 205(c) in 1974.
Thus, the Treasury's revelation of its alleged past practice fails to counter the
argument that the new regulations were precluded by the mandate of § 205(c).
No past practice is needed, however, to reconcile the new regulations with the
statute. See text accompanying notes 95-107 infra.
94 Westinghouse Memorandum, supra note 93, at 1-3; Comments of Westing-
house Electric Corp. on Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise from
State-Controlled-Economy Countries 9 (Feb. 15, 1978) [hereinafter cited as West-
inghouse Comments] (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review); Harley Davidson Comments, supra note 67, at 6-7.
95The House Report read:
A new subsection (c) to § 205 is also added to adopt in the law the
substance of the existing Treasury Department practice, as reflected in
§ 153.5(b) of the Treasury's antidumping regulations (19 C.F.R. 153.5(b))
The amendment would confirm the Treasury practice under which
the Secretary makes the necessary dumping determinations with respect to
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1921.96 By filling in that lacuna and clearly expressing its intent to
ratify Treasury's innovative use of administrative discretion, Con-
gress did not curtail Treasury's discretion in continuing to deal
responsibly with a slippery problem of international trade.
9 7 It
would be odd indeed if Congress's attempt to bestow its stamp of
approval had the opposite effect of putting a straitjacket on
Treasury's exercise of discretion. Applied generally, that obtuse
interpretation of the legislative history of section 205(c) would
stymie meaningful collaboration between Congress and the admin-
istrative arm of government.
98
state-controlled-economy countries based on prices at which such or sim-
ilar merchandise of a non-state-controlled-economy country is sold either
for consumption in its home market or to other countries, or based on the
constructive value of such or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled-
economy country.
1973 H.R. REP., supra note 48, at 72.
The Senate Report stated:
The second amendment to section 205, to be added as a new subsection
(c), also unchanged from the House bill, would adopt, in substance,
existing Treasury regulations concerning standards for comparison to be
employed in investigations of merchandise imported from State-controlled-
economy countries.... Accordingly, the amendments would confirm the
existing Treasury practice ....
1974 S. REP., supra note 13, at 174, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nmvs 7186, 7311.
96 Anthony, supra note 4, at 201-04. See text accompanying notes 32-43
supra.
97Both the House and the Senate Reports speak of adopting the existing
Treasury practice, in substance. See note 95 supra. These reservations can be read
as intending to leave the Treasury free to modify its regulations within the basic
framework, endorsed by § 205(c), of using third-country tests to determine foreign
market value.
98A useful analogy can be found in the doctrine that reenactment of a statute
gives legislative sanction to its administrative interpretation. See generally K. DAVIS,
ADmwiSTRA=TI LAW TEATISE § 5.07 (1958). There, too, the question has arisen
whether such implied legislative adoption of a regulation prohibits the administrative
agency from amending it without express authority from Congress. In Helvering v.
Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941), the Supreme Court answered that question in the
negative, noting that the prior administrative construction of the reenacted statute
does not "become so embedded in the law that only Congress can effect a change.
. . . It gives way before changes in the prior rule or practice through exercise by
the administrative agency of its continuing rule-making power." Id. 432. K. DAVIS,
supra, at § 5.10.
Dean Griswold's thinking on the reenactment problem also supports the view
taken here. Observing that, in general, the effect to be given to reenactment is
"essentially one of administration rather than of law," Griswold, A Summary of the
Regulations Problem, 54 HAnv. L. REv. 398, 423 (1941), he remarked that "there
must be freedom in working out the proper construction of a statute in the early
days after its enactment." Id. 413. Even after an interpretive regulation has been
established, it may be that the agency ought to be allowed to amend it prospectively,
if not retroactively. Id. 416. That the Treasury was involved in just this process
of "fine-tuning" its regulations in the early days following the enactment of § 205(c)
is apparent-the Department's decision to issue the regulations was prompted by its
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One variation on the legislative history argument contended
that the regulations' preference for the constructed-value method
when comparable prices are unavailable conflicted with a congres-
sional preference, manifest in the legislative history, that domestic
prices of United States producers be used whenever adequate price
data from other market-economy countries cannot be found.99 The
experience in administering § 205(c), and Treasury announced that it recognized
the need to assess the effect of the amendments as soon as possible. 43 Fed. Reg.
35,262, 35,263, 35,264-65 (1978). To the extent that the pre-1978 regulation had
become established, Treasury's decision to apply the new regulation prospectively
also conformed to the Griswold view. See note 75 supra.
99 1978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 117, 122 (statement of
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.); Westinghouse Comments, supra note 94, at 11.
This interpretation of §205(c), if adopted, would put the United States in
violation of its international obligations as defined in the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions (MTN) just concluded. Article 15 of the Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Apr. 12, 1979), MTN AcnFMMENTS, supra note 1, at 30-31, allows the
United States to calculate the foreign market value of SCE imports on the basis of
a third-country price or constructed value, but limits the use of domestic United
States prices by stating: "If neither prices nor constructed value . . . provide an
adequate basis for determination of dumping . . . then the price in the importing
signatory [the United States price] . . . may be used." Id. 30. Consistency with
this MTN Agreement mandates that United States prices be employed as the
determinants of foreign market value only if both third-country prices and con-
structed-value prove inadequate.
What effect should be given to Article 15 as a matter of domestic United States
law is a question that admits of no easy answer. On the one hand, Congress clearly
provided that any portion of the MTN Agreements it approved that conflicted with
United States statutes would not take effect as domestic law. Thus if a court were
to decide that Congress meant the Treasury to use United States manufacturers'
prices before resorting to constructed value, § 205 (c) would conflict with Article 15
of the MTN Agreement, and the latter would fall.
On the other hand, the House Report states that Title I of the 1979 Act
"encompasses those changes to the current countervailing duty and antidumping
laws necessary or appropriate to the implementation of the international agree-
ments on these subjects," 1979 H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 45. It also announces
the intent of Congress "to make U.S. law and practice consistent with" the Anti-
dumping Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Id. 59.
Had Congress understood § 205(c) to require use of United States prices before
third-country constructed value, a priority inconsistent with the GATT Code, this
statement of intent would lead one to expect a clarification of § 205(c). That none
was forthcoming suggests that § 205(c) in 1974, and as reenacted in 1979, only
allows use of United States prices when third-country-price and constructed value
tests are inadequate.
This suggestion is not refuted by the disclaimer in the House Report, supra,
at 76-77, denying any intent to approve or disapprove the new Treasury regu-
lations. See note 23 supra. Although those regulations added the comparability
criterion, they preserved the former regulations in allowing reference to United States
prices only when price and constructed values do not provide an adequate basis for
comparison. See text of pre-1978 regulation at note 89 supra. The House Report's
caveat can best be understood as applying to the innovative aspects of the September,
1978, regulations. Had Congress wished to reserve its judgment on the pre-1978
regulation, it might easily have done so.
To summarize-although the question could be decided either way, the most
sensible interpretation of Title I of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is that
Congress intended to adopt Article 15's amendment of the GATT Anti-dumping
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legislative history on which the defenders of American industry here
relied consists of a single sentence in the Senate Report, °0 which
establishes only an intent to "permit" and not an intent to require
use of domestic United States manufacturers' prices in determining
fair value. The 1978 regulations are thus consistent with this legis-
lative history, because they provide for the use of those prices when
all other prices or constructed-value referents fail.
A third statutory argument presented by representatives of
American industry opposed to the new regulations centered on the
use of the SCE country's actual physical inputs as the base data for
constructed value. They contended that the purpose of section
205(c) was to prohibit consideration of the prices or costs of produc-
tion in the SCE country. Calculating the costs of production on
the basis of verified physical inputs was, according to these op-
ponents, likewise within the Act's proscription. 10'
Responding to this criticism, the Treasury conceded that SCE-
country prices and costs are unreliable, but insisted that the actual
physical inputs of production can be ascertained without difficulty
and then valued in a market-economy country. 02 Such a procedure,
the Treasury maintained, effectuates the congressional intent to
avoid reliance on artificial price and cost figures, while observing
section 205(c)'s directive to find the "normal costs" of imported
merchandise. 103
The regulations' opponents did not lack a reply. Ingeniously
they countered that in an SCE country, even the actual physical
inputs are skewed because the mix of labor, raw materials, and
energy that goes into manufacturing a product ordinarily depends
on the relative cost of each factor. In a market-economy country, if
labor is cheap and sophisticated machinery expensive, a manufac-
turer will use relatively more labor. In an SCE country, however,
the mix of physical inputs is determined not by market forces, but
by government decisionmaking, for instance, state subsidization of
automated machinery.0 4 A calculus of costs based solely on these
Code and thought § 205(c), as elaborated by Treasury's pre- and post-1978 regu-
lations, consistent with that Article. This interpretation also has the advantage
of making United States domestic law consistent with international obligations.
100 1974 S. REP., supra note 13, at 174, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 7186, 7311. See note 50 supra.
10143 Fed. Reg. 35,262, 35,263 (1978).
102 Id.
103 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) (repealed, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, Title I, § 106, 93 Stat 144 (July 26, 1979); current version at id.,
Title I, § 101, to be codified as an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930, at 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(e) ).
104 Westinghouse Comments, supra note 94, at 14-15.
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physical factors of production thus fails to account for the hidden
costs of government intervention in the economy, as, for ex-
ample, a rise in food prices to finance new technology for the
export of lightbulbs. When Congress ruled that prices and costs of
an SCE country should not be used to calculate fair value, it was
argued, the prohibition extended as well to the actual physical in-
puts of production. 1 5
As a statutory argument, this reasoning is perhaps too clever.
At best it demonstrates that Congress would have been consistent
had it banned reliance on physical inputs as well as prices. But
Congress, it is clear, never considered that eventuality and meant
only to confirm the existing practice of the Treasury. Especially
when one considers the "principle that the construction of a statute
by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong,"' 16 it would be difficult
to say that the Treasury is mistaken in its understanding of what
Congress meant to forbid in section 205(c). 10 7
B. Policy Objections
In addition to the statutory arguments, the standard of com-
parability embraced by Treasury's recent regulations has also been
subjected to a barrage of criticism on policy grounds. Questioning
has focused on the use of per capita GNP as the criterion of com-
parable development, the availability of GNP figures for SCE
countries, the assumption that countries at comparable stages of
development have comparable internal costs and prices, and the
decision to apply the comparability standard, not to comparable
105 Id. Similarly it was argued that § 205(c) was intended to prohibit use
of GNP figures from SCE countries for the purpose of assessing comparability of
economic development. INTERFACE ONE, supra note 5, at 186 (remarks of Richard
0. Cunningham); Westinghouse Comments, supra note 94, at 12-13. See Westing-
house Memorandum, supra note 93, at 5-7. Yet no evidence that Congress gave
any consideration to the reliability of such macroeconomic data was offered.
106 Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 144-45 n.25 (1979) (quoting Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnote omitted)). Accord,'
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S.
234, 251 (1978).
107 As a matter of policy, the failure of the new approach to constructed value
to include certain hidden costs of the SCE producer need not be a fatal flaw. Re-
source allocation, even in an SCE country, is not without limits. Moreover, market-
economy-country producers have hidden costs, too, resulting from social legislation
tax loopholes, government subsidies, and the like. Any estimate of constructed
value is at best an approximation, and the question ought not to be whether the
new method of calculation is a perfect one, but whether it permits a more accurate
and fairer picture of the value of SCE imports than the former method of selecting
a third country virtually at random. IuRFAcE ONE, supra note 5, at 75, 85 (ad-
dress by Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Peter D. Ehrenhaft). See text
accompanying notes 108-20 infra.
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producers or industries in market-economy countries, but rather to
comparable market countries as a whole.
The selection of per capita GNP as the chief criterion for com-
paring the development of free market and SCE countries was at-
tacked as arbitrary on the ground that other recognized measures of
economic development, such as the level of industrialization, yield
conflicting results.""" According to this view, almost any level of
development can be assigned to a given SCE country, depending
upon the criterion chosen. That other indicia of development yield
different results, however, does not impair the validity of Treasury's
choice of per capita GNP. The point of selecting a comparably
developed economy is to find a surrogate country in which costs and
prices most nearly reflect the costs and prices of the SCE country.
Per capita GNP has the virtue of correlating closely with the general
level of wages, 0 9 and wages, in general, make up the greater part of
production costs. Unlike other criteria of development, such as the
level of industrialization, per capita GNP can thus be used to iden-
tify the market-economy countries whose labor costs, and overall
production costs, will be most comparable to the costs in the SCE
country.
The availability of sufficient statistical data to determine the
GNP of SCE countries has also been a subject of dispute. Critics
of the regulations note that in contrast to market-economy countries,
which report gross national product in accordance with the United
Nations System of National Accounts, SCE countries report a net
material product based on different kinds of data."0O While ac-
knowledging that projections of GNP for SCE countries have been
made, these same critics contend that such estimates are imprecise.
On the other hand, economists who have addressed this question
have concluded that any imprecision inherent in Western recalcula-
tions of GNP figures from SCE countries is not likely to be so
1081979 House MTN Hearings, supra note 19, at 106, 108 (statement of
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.); id. 112-15 (paper by Professor Stanislaw Wasowski,
prepared for Harley Davidson Co.).
1 0 9 INTERFACE ONE, supra note 5, at 209 (remarks of Professor Franklyn D.
Holzman); id. 231 (remarks of Richard 0. Cunningham).
1101978 Antidumping Act Hearing, supra note 20, at 117, 127 (statement of
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.); Westinghouse Comments, supra note 94, at 12.
In recent years a number of projects have attempted to develop methods for
comparing the GNPs of market-economy and SCE countries. The most ambitious
study, undertaken by the United Nations Statistical Office and the University of
Pennsylvania, and supported by the World Bank, began in 1968 and is now near-
ing completion. See A SYSTEm OF INTERNAT5ONAL ComT'MrsoNs or GRoss PRODUCT
AN PURCHASING POWER: PkAsE I (I Kravis ed. 1975); INTERNATIONAL CoM-
pARISONS OF REAL PToDucT AND PURCHASING POWER: PHASE II (I. Kravis ed.
1978).
240 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
statistically significant as to detract from the viability of per capita
GNP as a criterion of comparable development."1
Although greater statistical exactitude is desirable in this area,
it is important to keep in mind the alternative methods of selecting
a third country. The relevant question is not whether per capita
GNP offers a perfect method of comparison, but whether it repre-
sents a significant advance over the former method of selecting a
surrogate country virtually at random. 112 Examined in this light,
the imperfections in computing GNP figures for SCE countries do
not undermine the value of Treasury's new regulations, especially
when the availability of additional criteria, such as the level of infra-
structure development, is taken into account.
A similar analysis suffices to rebut a third complaint directed at
the per capita GNP test. Opponents of the regulations insisted
repeatedly that the GNP criterion rested on the fallacious assump-
tion that countries with comparable GNPs have comparable internal
costs or prices. 13 Although large differences in particular com-
parative advantages may not show up in gross figures, they can create
severe distortions in particular price comparisons between countries.
In mineral-rich nations like Saudi Arabia, for example, higher per
capita GNP may coexist with relatively low internal prices. The
likelihood of such distortions, according to this view, renders the per
capita GNP test worthless as a tool for ascertaining the foreign
market value of SCE products.
In its extreme form this argument is misleading. It is true that
GNP levels do not accurately reflect the distribution of natural
resources among countries. But per capita GNP is a reliable indi-
cator of general wage levels,"x4 a major factor in production costs,"15
especially for manufactured items. 1 6 Moreover, the regulations do
not restrict Treasury to this measure alone, but allow comparability
to be determined from "generally recognized criteria," including
"infrastructure development (particularly in the industry producing
Ill INTERFAcE ONE, supra note 5, at 209 (remarks of Professor Paul Marer);
id. 209-10 (remarks of Professor Franklyn D. Holzman); see Soltysinski, The
United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws from a Socialist Economy
Perspective 13-14 (July 21, 1978) (unpublished paper on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review).
1
1 2
LNERFAcE ONE, supra note 5, at 175, 185 (address by Deputy Assistant
Treasury Secretary Peter D. Ehrenhaft).
.3 E.g., 1979 House MTN Hearings, supra note 19, at 106, 107-08 (statement
of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.); id. 114-15 (paper by Professor Stanislaw Wasowski,
prepared for Harley Davidson).
11
4 See note 109 supra.
115 NTEmAcE ONE, supra note 5, at 209 (remarks of Professor Franklyn D.
Holzman).
116Id. 229 (remarks of Professor Stanislaw J. Soltysinski).
[Vol. i128:217
1979] DUMPING BY STATE-CONTROLLED-ECONOMY COUNTRIES 241
such or similar merchandise)." 117 By employing additional criteria
of comparability, Treasury will be able to avoid the spectre of
grossly distorted price and cost comparisons. Here, once again, a
perfect comparison is not the issue, but rather a method that most
closely approximates the real value of the imported goods. On this
score, no one could reasonably doubt that a market-economy country
of matching per capita GNP is a more likely candidate for a fair
approximation than a third country selected arbitrarily.
Perhaps the most sophisticated policy argument against the
comparability test adopted by the Treasury is that which would
place the focus not on comparable economies, but on comparable
producers.118 Treasury's test, the argument begins, is biased in favor
of the SCE producer, because it allows the foreign market value of
his goods to be computed in accordance with the lower prices or
costs of a comparably developed economy, and not on the basis of
the higher prices or costs prevailing in more advanced economies
where a comparably sophisticated producer would normally be
found.1 9 Sophisticated manufacturers are typically located in ad-
vanced market-economy countries because, there, decisions to invest
in labor-saving equipment are private ones, spurred by high labor
costs. Where labor is cheap, market forces militate against large
capital investments in advanced plants. These market relationships,
however, are replaced in the SCE country by government planning,
which permits highly automated plants and cheap labor to exist
side by side. When such a situation occurs, as it did in the Polish
Golf Cart Case, Treasury's comparable-economy test gives the SCE
producer the double benefit of higher efficiency and inexpensive
labor.120 This "unfair" advantage to the SCE producer could be
eliminated, according to this view, by basing the selection of a third-
country surrogate on the existence of a comparable producer or
comparable industry.
The logic supporting the comparable-producer proposal pro-
vocatively illustrates section 205(c)'s potential for discriminating
against SCE imports on ideological grounds. Instead of seeking to
estimate the foreign market value of SCE goods, the comparable-
producer test would deprive a country like Poland of its actual cost
advantages on the theory that any cost advantage accruing to an
1719 C.F.R. § 153.7(b)(1) (1979).
118 See 1979 House MTN Hearings, supra note 19, at 93, 100-01 (statement
of Richard 0. Cunningham); INTvnFAcE ONE, supra note 5, at 187-88 (remarks
of Richard 0. Cunningham).
19 See note 118 supra.
120 Id.
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SCE country by virtue of its nonmarket orientation must be disre-
garded as "unfair." In effect, such an approach to valuation would
penalize SCE countries for departing from cherished free market
principles and would erect an impermeable barrier to SCE imports.
It should be acknowledged that the policy underlying the com-
parable-producer proposal is not an incoherent one. No doubt
ardent defenders of free enterprise could be found who would seri-
ously maintain that, for instance, the low labor costs enjoyed by
SCE producers are in theory illusory, and that the higher labor
costs prevailing in more advanced market-economy countries con-
stitute the SCE producer's true labor costs. Congress, however, in
enacting section 205(c), gave no indication of embracing a theo-
retical approach to valuation so antagonistic to trade with SCE
countries. It was concerned with the more mundane problem of
calculating the actual value of SCE imports in the absence of reli-
able market prices and costs. That pragmatic attitude was also the
essence of wisdom. In an increasingly complex and interdependent
world economy, cold-war shibboleths adapted for protectionist uses
may well close the doors to peace and prosperity.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of United States antidumping law is to discourage
unfair price-discrimination practices in the importation of foreign-
made goods into the United States. Because of the difficulty of
ascertaining the foreign market value of imported goods, there is
always a danger that antidumping measures will be subverted to
protectionist designs. As a result, domestic markets characterized by
excessive concentration, inefficient producers, or inflated prices may
be shielded from the healthy competition of lower-priced imports.
This danger is especially acute in the application of the anti-
dumping law to imports from state-controlled-economy countries.
Because costs and prices in those countries are set more or less in-
dependently of market forces, the ordinary tests of foreign market
value do not apply, and valuation is necessarily speculative. Experi-
ence with this problem in the Polish Golf Cart Case led the Treasury
Department, in 1978, to promulgate new regulations which attempt
a fairer and more rational valuation of SCE imports.
The new Treasury regulations, although admittedly imperfect,
can withstand the criticisms levelled at them by American industrial
interests. The statutory objections rely mainly on exaggerated and
unconvincing perceptions of congressional intent, while the objec-
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tions based on policy focus on the regulations' potential problems
without denying, or seriously confronting, the obvious inadequacies
of the former rules. The one alternative approach advanced by
these critics-a proposal that a third country be selected on the
basis of a comparable producer-is a thinly disguised vehicle of
protectionism, which would erect a barrier to all manufactured
products imported from SCE countries.
The importance of the Treasury regulations cannot be over-
estimated. In order to improve the balance of payments and in-
crease trade, countries like Poland will increasingly seek to sell in
the United States market sophisticated, labor-intensive products that
require large capital investment. The Polish Golf Cart Case marked
the first time an SCE country was successful in pursuing such a
course.1 1 If, given these economic realities, United States anti-
dumping law is to be amended to discriminate against imports from
countries of communist or socialist persuasion, the task belongs to
Congress, and not to the executive branch or to the courts. 2 2 Con-
sistent with the national policy favoring free trade and the will of
Congress as expressed in section 205 (c), Treasury's September, 1978,
regulations take a much needed step towards fair and evenhanded
application of the antidumping law to imports from SCE countries.
1 2 1 INTERrACE Owz, supra note 5, at 95-96 (remarks of Professor Stanislaw J.
Soltysinski).
122 See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, [1979] 5 LAB. REL. REP. (24 Wage & Hour Cas.)
162, 170 (D.C. Cir., June 22, 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3107 (1979).
In Kahn, the plaintiffs argued that the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act
(COWPSA) deprived President Carter of authority to require government con-
tractors to comply with wage and price guidelines. Chief Judge Wright, writing
for the court en banc, found support for the President's procurement program in
Congress's renewal of COWPSA in 1979 without significant modification. Although
he noted that the legislative history of the 1979 extension demonstrated full Con-
gressional awareness of the President's program and contained express assertions of
an intent to withhold judgment on its validity, id. 169-70, Chief Judge Wright
reasoned that, because "Congress can reverse incorrect Executive interpretations of
its statutes and has used that power in the past,... [i]n this context, a court could
only in the most extreme case find that the Executive has violated the statute."
Id. 170 (footnote omitted).
A similar approach to the reenactment of § 205(c) in the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 would preclude a judicial finding that the original passage of § 205(c)
deprived the Treasury of authority to issue its 1978 regulations. Here the argument
is even stronger than in Kahn, where Congress merely extended the COWPSA for
an additional year without meaningful alterations, because the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 made extensive changes in the antidumping law, but preserved § 205(c)
intact. Although, as in Kahn, the legislative history evinces an express attempt to
avoid the issue of the validity of an administrative action, see note 23 supra, Kahn
teaches that these reservations should not be taken at face value. Rather, after
Kahn, attempts by Congress to duck resolution of a controversy by passing the buck
to the courts should be viewed, in all but the most extreme cases, as impliedly
approving the questioned administrative practice.
